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Traditional human capital theory emphasizes a worker’s investment in knowledge.  However, when
a worker is faced with day-to-day problems on the job, the solutions to the problems often require
more knowledge from a team of experts within the firm.  When a worker taps into the knowledge of
experts, the worker develops his “connective capital.”  Firms that value problem solving highly will
develop the human resource management practices that support the environment of sharing knowledge.
Data from the steel industry displays these concepts.  For seven large steel mills, we gather data on
the communications networks of steelworkers.  The data shows that networks are exceedingly diverse
across mills, and that the mills that have human resource management practices that support teamwork
are the mills that have with much more dense high-volume communications links among workers.
That is, workers in team-orientated mills have much higher levels of personal connective capital used
for problem-solving.
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“Capital consists in a great part of knowledge and organization.” 
      -- Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics  
   
Many growing firms today – firms across high-tech to bio-tech to consulting to banking 
industries  –  are  comprised  of  experts.    Skills  are  deep;  individuals  specialize  in  expert 
knowledge.    Workers  may  be  experts  in  new  wireless  programming  code,  or  chemical 
compounds, or client relationships.  The firm‘s production function is to solve problems – to 
create a new wireless phone, or a new drug, or to install new planning software that meets a 
client‘s specific needs.  Solving these problems requires that experts work together – no one 
person has all the skills to solve a typical problem. Therefore, each person‘s output in solving his 
problems depends on his own human capital, and also on the human capital of all others in the 
firm whom he ‗connects with‘ to solve his problems.   
We model each person‘s optimal investment in  ―connective capital,‖ which is a new 
definition of capital in the firm:  connective capital is the sum of the person‘s own capital and the 
knowledge capital of others who he taps into to solve a problem he faces.  Just as economists 
have modeled the investments by workers and firms in general human capital and firm-specific 
human capital, we introduce this new firm of human capital into the firm‘s production function, 
and model what induces workers and firms to invest in connective capital.   Given a simple 
production  function  in  which  connective  capital  raises  the  firm‘s  output,  the  questions  for 
workers are: how much should each worker tap into the skills of others, and how much should 
others be willing to share their skills?  For firms, the question is, how much should the firm 
invest  in  a  structure  that  supports  workers‘  investments  in  connective  capital?  Due  to  the 
externalities arising from connective capital and the group-based rewards in most firms, workers 
will tend to under-invest in connective capital.  Therefore, firms that value problem solving in 
production will invest in organizational practices to increase individual investment in connective 
capital.    Given data we‘ve collected on the communications patterns of skilled workers in the 
steel industry, we examine patterns of connective capital empirically from the workers and from 
the firms perspectives.   
Our model of connective capital has some of the elements of social capital.  Social capital 
is now a very broad and very widely used term.  The rise of the Internet has made it a household   3 
term.  Consider, for example, the use of the websites LinkedIn or FaceBook.  The users of these 
websites develop a social network of contacts of people who are friends or friends of friends (and 
thus not known to the person).  Social capital is then the value that arises because the person can 
tap into their social network to solve problems of some form.  It is capital, because these social 
networks have value—the network can be used to obtain information, to find a job, achieve 
social mobility, or to undertake collective action, etc.  Social capital arises at different levels – at 
the individual level, at the firm level, or at the community level.  It is increasingly discussed as 
the fabric on which the successes of communities and of firms are based.   
Social capital is modeled by researchers in many different ways – at different levels (i.e., 
individual or firm or community), and with different attributes or properties that underlie the 
social networks or the social capital.  Economists introduce social network relationships when 
ways they develop models of hierarchies.
1  A more vertically hierarchical firm will have more 
information flowing through indirect network ties up the hierarchy; a flat organization will have 
information flowing through direct ties, or direct network communications.  Thus, researchers 
model the value o f hierarchical  ties and the decision rights implied by hierarchy.   Other 
economists look empirically at the value that arises from social capital that varies across 
communities.
2  Some economists model the underlying microeconomic features of network 
relationships  – such as the game theoretical  models  of why  and where links  develop in  the 
network – that could arise in firms or in communities.
3  Economists are recent entrants to the 
literature on the  theory of social capital.
4  Non-economists have modeled social networks  for 
many years, and have a very deep literature, but that literature has tended to focus more on the 
value of the social network to individual‘s rather than the firm, and most empirical evidence is 
on the value of networks to individuals.
5   Looking deeper within these models, there is also a 
multi-disciplinary literature on trust and reciprocity, which are  often features of social capital 
(described below). We mention here a few elements of the social capital literature to emphasize 
                                                            
1 For models of hierarchies, see Garicano (2000), Garicano and Hubbard (2006), Bolton and Dewatripoint (1994), 
Aoki (1984), Geanakopolos and Milgrom (1991).   
2 For empirical models of social capital that model capital between individuals or communities see Costa and Kahn 
(forthcoming, 2005), Golden and Katz (1999), Agrawal, Cockburn and McHale (2003), Charles and Kline (2002), 
Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002). 
3 See, for example, Jackson and Sonnenschien (2007), and the references in footnote 4.  
4  For a summary of the entry of econ omists into social capital theories,  and  a summary of social capital in 
economics, as well as new models of social networks, see Jackson (2008, 2007, and forthcoming).  For an additional 
review of social capital in theoretical economics, see Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004). 
5 See Burt (2005), forthcoming.    4 
that  it  is  a  broad  and  deep  and  massive  literature,  and  the  phrase  social  capital  has  many 
meanings.  In this paper, our goal in developing a model defined as ―connective capital‖ is to 
emphasize a few features of social capital that enter the theory of the firm. 
Our goal in defining connective capital is to emphasize that it is optimal for firms to  
develop human resource management practices that will raise the productivity of their employees 
by inducing employees to solve problems using connective capital.
6  Firms will invest in human 
resource practices – such as developing norms of behavior through indoctrination, training, and 
teamwork – that have value to  the firm  because they support the investment  by  workers in 
connective capital.  This is a model of teamwork, where the firm is the team.  Because we focus 
on  individual  behavior,  we  introduce  connective  capital  directly  into  the  firm‘s  production 
function as a non-linear form of human capital.  Just as there are many forms of human capital 
(such as firm-specific skills or occupational skills), we treat connective capital as a special form 
of human capital and we identify some properties of connective capital that produce differential 
investments in it across individuals and firms. We then tie our model of connective capital to 
data from steel mills, to draw illustrative links between the development of connective capital at 
the worker level, the use by the firm of HR practices to induce individuals‘ connective capital, 
and the productivity gains that can result from connective capital.
7     
Our model is also an extension of the literature on teams, in that we emphasize the value 
to  firms  of  employees  working  together  in  a  complementary  fashion  to  solve  problems.   
However, we follow the tradition in economics of focusing on how  individuals do their jobs to 
be the most productive.
8  Individuals are the unit of analyses within the firm, not teams.  The 
model of connective capital specifies that individuals are faced with problems, call upon the 
skills of other experts, and then solve the problem by tapping into the other expert skills.  This is 
                                                            
6 This theoretical point – that firms invest in human resource practices aimed at increasing social capital – is not new 
to the organizational literature. See Leana and Van Buren (1999), Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1991), Coleman (1988), 
and Burt (2005, forthcoming). 
7 The empirical literature showing a link between social capital and the productivity of workers and firms is just 
developing.  In the economics  literature, see Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2005, for thcoming); Sabatini (2005); 
Kalnins and Chung (2006), Gil and Hartmann (2007);  and  see Heliwell and Huang (2005) for effects on worker 
well being in firms.  More broadly, see Leana and Pil (2006),  Yli-Renko, Autio, and Sapienza (2001), Reagans and 
Zuckerman (2001), The advent of datasets based on email archives and on open source software projects is 
increasing the ability of researchers to model the performance of networks  – see Aral and Van Alstyne (2008) and 
Singh, Tan, and Mookerjee (2008).  For work showing peer effects that have similar social capital issues, see Mas 
and Moretti (2009) 
8 That is, our decision-making production unit is the individual worker, not a team of workers.  Individuals solve 
problems by taping into the knowledge of other to form a ‗team‘ output, but the team is not our unit of analysis.     5 
teamwork, but we model it as individual activities.  The model of connective capital focuses on 
how the organization is structured so that individuals can get access to the skills of others as 
needed.  In keeping with the quote by Marshall above, our overarching goal is emphasize, as 
many organizational or personnel economists have done, that the returns to human capital, or to 
the firm‘s ‗knowledge‘ base, depend on how the firm is organized.  In section I, we develop the 
model, and in section II, we provide empirical evidence on the determinants of the investment in 
connective capital.   
I. A Model of Investments in Connective Capital 
  This section presents a model of teamwork among employees.  We define the idea of 
―connective capital‖ as a form of knowledge and human capital sharing that helps employees 
solve problems  in  the  workplace.  We consider why workers would decide to  share human 
capital with one another even in large firms where workers may not work with one another in the 
future. We also consider how firms can invest in human resource policies to develop a culture of 
teamwork inside the firm that would further promote problem-solving activity. 
A. A Definition of Connective Capital  
Just as human capital refers to knowledge and skills of individuals, connective capital   is 
the sum of the person‘s own human capital and the human capital of others that he taps into to 
solve his problems.  The definition of connective capital has three components: the specification 
of a group, a measure of connections made among these group members, and the human capital 
that is shared.  The group is an N-person firm, with i and j the subscripts denoting the workers.  
Connective capital of worker i in period t, CCit,, is the (N-1) element vector that measures the 
knowledge that the other workers share with worker i:  
             
(1)  CCit =  (cci1t * HC1, … ccijt * HCj, … cciNt * HCN) for ji   
           
In the j-th element of the connective capital vector, ccij is a (0,1) dummy variable that as the key 
connective capital link between workers cijt=1 when worker j talks to worker i and HCj measures 
worker j‘s knowledge. What matters for whether worker i accesses new human capital through 
the communication link with j is the difference in knowledge of the two workers. We create   6 
these differences by assuming each worker in the firm as an expert in his or her own individual 
area with unique knowledge. This is described further at the end of Section IC below.
9 In our 
steel data below, the steel operating workers are each  different  experts in the techniques  of 
operating a steel production line.
    
Our model of connective capital is therefore a model of when communication links are 
formed, or when ccijt =1 versus ccijt  =0.  When a worker i need the unique expert knowledge of 
worker j, then worker i asks for help and worker j responds, and then ccijt  =1.  Thus, after 
specifying the production function that introduces CCit, we model the communications links, 
ccijt.  
B. The Output from Connective Capital and Team Problem-Solving 
Productivity gains result from solving complex problems using connective capital. When 
worker i confronts a problem he cannot solve on his own, but is successful at getting knowledge 
from the necessary experts in the workforce, he solves the problem and increases his output.
10 
Let a worker‘s output be a function of two human capital variables – the individual worker‘s own 
human capital, HCi, and the connective capital he collects while working on problems, CCi.
11 In 
any period t, output of worker i is reduced whenever workers i and j spend time communicating 
to solve problems, but this joint problem solving leads to an increase in output in the next period. 
Therefore, define output, qit, for person i at time t as: 
 
(2)  qit =   HCit  +  δ'CCi,t-1 - (OPCOST)it 
 
                                                            
9 The assumption that the workers have their own unique areas of expertise only serves to simplify the presentation.  
To allow more detailed differences in knowledge, one would allow worker i to have some knowledge in all N areas, 
and rewrite the j-th element of the connective capital vector in (1) as cc ij * HCij where HCij equals the difference 
between two workers‘ human capital. Throughout, we assume a worker‘s amount of human capital is exogenous.  
10 The model below will assume that workers know whom to contact by the nature of the problems and thus do not 
incur search costs involved in finding the right employees.  With search costs, the past stock of connective capital 
would lower the costs of investing in current connective capital, because workers build knowledge about whom to 
contact. Such a state dependence effect in which past CC builds current CC would complicate the model, but would 
slow the process of moving to higher levels of CC bec ause of the adjustment costs involved in learning where 
knowledge resides. Such search costs could be seen as a component of the opportunity costs of communication in 
the model below. 
11 Thus, the model here is analogous to productivity effects of spillover s of R&D knowledge across firms in an 
industry (see Griliches, 1979).   7 
where we assume for simplicity that HCit and CCi,t-1 are additively separable in producing qit.
12  
We also assume that the output of the firm is additively separable in personal output q it, so that 
firm-level  output  Qt  = ∑  qit.  In  (2),   is  the  production  return  to  person  i‘s  human  capital. 
OPCOST is lost output in period t due to worker i spending time on new problem solving during 
this  period,  or  τHCit,  where  τ  is  the  fraction  of  time  in  period  t  that  worker  i  spends 
communicating.  Finally, the vector  is the production return to worker i from the connective 
capital he obtained in the prior period. The j-th element of the vector (j) is the return to i from 
gaining information from j. Thus,  is an index of the value of problem-solving activity.  is 
higher when a worker encounters many problems and when solving these problems has a larger 
impact on output.
13 
While workers in all organizations confront problems in their workplaces that impact 
productivity, the data we analyze below pertain to workers in finishing lines in integrated steel 
mills. An example illustrates how knowledge sharing through connective capital raises output in 
this setting. In these lines, long rolls of thin steel sheets unwind and run thr ough machinery that 
stretch the steel and apply various protective coatings. If steel coating forms bubbles or has an 
uneven texture, the finished steel product cannot be sold since quality will be below required 
standards. To identify the source of the problem from many possible sources, an employee can 
draw upon his own training and experience, or can tap into the expertise and experience of 
others. Co-workers can have different technical expertise or they may have unique knowledge 
given their particular  vantage point on the production line, each of which could be useful in 
solving new problems. Lines that can tap into the problem -solving capabilities of teams of 
workers often realize large improvements in performance from these efforts.
14   
                                                            
12 Multiplicative interactions between individual human capital and the human capital that constitutes connective 
capital would complicate the analysis but not change the essential points to follow. 
13 We keep the definition of    quite simple: some firms have high  because during the course of the year, each 
person i will face problems that are best solved with skills from person j.  We could complicate this much more by 
making the arrival of problems, and thus the value of , a random process with a variance, but that wouldn‘t change 
the essence of the model.   
14 Some finishing lines reported to us that the number of continuous improvement problem solving projects range 
between 40 and 60 projects per line each year.  We observed numerous examples of consequential problem solving 
projects during our line visits, such as the installation of dust collectors and tents to keep particulates from settling 
onto the steel, improving clamps for stabilizing steel coils so they can be trimme d to customer orders more 
accurately, redesigning the engineers‘ original designs for coating machine rollers so that surfaces were coated more 
uniformly, and improvements in the durability of welds that prevented breaks between successive coils of steel.   8 
In  other  organizations,  critical  business  activities,  such  as  designing  a  new  product, 
devising a marketing campaign, or developing a business strategy, can all involve this kind of 
collaborative  problem  solving.  The  question  we  consider  in  this  section  is  why  some 
organizations are more likely to have employees working together to solve problems than others. 
C. Connective Capital Investments: The Workers’ Optimal Decisions to Connect 
The model thus far assumes three points. Some problems that workers confront are too 
complex  for  the  workers  to  solve  on  their  own.  Knowledge  sharing  among  workers  creates 
connective  capital.    And  connective  capital  is  a  productive  input  in  the  production  process 
because it leads to problem solving.
15 The essential idea of these initial assumptions is that they 
allow the N-person group to be smarter and more productive than the N individuals would be if 
they acted independently. Because group organization leverages the knowledge of individuals, 
the model provides a fundamental reason why organizations will form.  
If connective capital does increase productivity as assumed in equation (2), the central 
question to address becomes:  what determines the level of connective capital observed in the 
firm? We are modeling why information sharing occurs in a large social network such as a firm 
where an individual may be asked to share with someone he is not likely to work with again.   
That is, we are modeling reciprocity: reciprocity means that when people act friendly or helpful 
to me, I will respond by  acting friendly or helpful, even when there are no apparent personal 
gains to helping.   Small firms or  small groups may have personal  bilateral contracts—if you 
share today, I will share with you tomorrow.  But in larger firms, where the problems vary 
constantly over time, bilateral contracts between pairs are unlikely.  Each new problem requires a 
different  set  of  experts.      Thus,  we  are  modeling  a  process  of  reciprocity  –  or  mutual 
interdependent sharing – in which people reciprocate by sharing when asked because it will 
elevate the performance of the entire group (and thus their group pay) even when it does not 
build mutual personal gains between the pair.   This notion of reciprocity among strangers within 
a large group is a common theme in the literature of the social capital of communities and firms.   
                                                            
15 The model posits that connective capital is ―borrowed‖ to solve that period‘s problems.  One could allow for 
learning dynamics where worker i remembers some portion of CCit which augments HCi(t+1).  For simplicity in 
presentation, we present the model with workers remaining experts in their own areas but can call on experts in 
other areas again in the future as new problems arise. Put somewhat differently, we are assuming that learning a 
whole new area of expertise is prohibitively costly and that workers could never learn enough about these other 
areas to eliminate the need to call in the other experts when multi-person problems arise in the future.   9 
The key endogenous variable in connective capital investment is ccij, – the measure of 
whether two workers form a communication connection.  Worker i encounters a problem and 
faces the decision of whether to ask worker j for his help. Aij = 1 if worker i asks j and Aij = 0 if 
he does not. Worker j faces the decision of whether to respond: Sji = 1 if worker j shares human 
capital knowledge with the asker and Sji = 0 if j does not. Therefore, define the communication 
channel between i and j as: 
(3)                    ccij = Aij●Sji 
ccij = 1 only if both Aij=1 and Sji=1. Once two workers decide to ask and share, they establish a 
communication channel and are now engaged in team problem solving. 
There is a production loss that arises when ―askers,‖ or Aij=1, and ―sharers,‖ or Sji=1, 
forge the communications link, in which ccij = 1. The production loss is the opportunity cost of 
the time they spend communicating – the value of time spent working on a problem with others 
that could have been spent instead on producing output individually: τ(ʱjHCj + ʱiHCi), where τ is 
the percent of time spent working together on joint problem solving activities by i and j. ‗τ‘ 
includes  the  time  it  takes  to  identify  and  contact  coworkers  as  well  as  the  time  spent 
communicating with them to solve a problem. This opportunity cost of time is higher when 
workers can produce high value output on their own (ʱiHCi). 
16 
There is also a person-specific disutility (or utility) cost of communicating. The cost of 
asking is 
A
i  . This cost can be related to personality – for example, a ―shy‖ or ―proud‖ worker 
may have more difficulty telling others that there are problems he cannot solve – or to ability – 
for example, a worker with poor organizational skills may have higher communication costs 
because he cannot manage multiple communication channels. The person-specific cost of sharing 
is 
s
j  . These sharing costs could reflect costs of effort or time, or other influences the worker 
faces, as when promotions are based on individual output and not on team problem solving.
17  
                                                            
16 If individuals were given individual incentive pay as a function of individual output then highly skilled , high 
ʱiHCi experts would never share. This is one reason why firms do not offer individual incentive pay, or offer a very 
low return to individual output. Alternatively, firms can pay individual incentives, but hire teams of equally skilled 
experts. So the gains to teamwork are equal across workers. It has been widely modeled that individual incentive 
pay undermines teamwork. 
 
17 The model does not incorporate promotions based on teamwork as part of the pay increase in the model, but we 
acknowledge that sharing costs would fall if the firm rewarded teamwork in this way.   10 
The  worker‘s  benefits  of  sharing  come  in  the  form  of  increased  compensation  from 
sharing due to increased output in the period after a problem has been addressed minus the 
personal  costs  of  sharing.  Let  worker  compensation  from  sharing  be  determined  by  group 
incentive pay where all workers divide output gains among themselves.  
The output gains  are  from  problem  solving occur  when  connective capital  is  created 
because Aij  and Sji  both equal  one.  If  asked, worker j  will  share (Sji=1) when his  marginal 
benefits of sharing exceed his marginal costs of sharing:  
(4)  1 given      if 1 ij    ij
s
j ji A B S   
Bij represents the marginal net monetary gains of sharing which is given by: 
(5)      Bij ≡ ( N HC HC HC d j j i i j ij / )] ( R[        )  
Worker j and worker i benefit from j‘s sharing because each obtains his increased share of the 
net output gains, Bij, that result from solving the problem that i faces. In (5), d is the discount 
factor (1/(1+r)), and τ is again the percent of time (or percent of base period human capital) that 
is  spent  on  communicating  rather  than  producing.  R  is  the  percent  of  net  problem  solving 
revenue allocated to workers as compensation.
18 We assume that workers are risk neutral, so 
workers share when the marginal income gain from the personal output gain in period t, given by 
N HC Rd j ij /  )- N HC HC R j j i i / ) (     ,  exceeds  the  marginal  personal  disutility  costs 




        Assume there is a distribution across work ers,   
s s F  , of the personal costs of sharing 
knowledge. Then the probability of sharing knowledge conditional on being asked is: 






j ij ji e ji d f A S P P   ) ( 1 | 1     for all persons j=1,..,N 
                                                            
18 We assume that the firm allocates a percent (R) of net revenue to workers and retains a percent for shareholders, 
as is typical for profit-sharing plans or worker-owned firms.  We will ass ume R is fixed at some value related to 
workers‘ alternative wage rates and not address its value in the model.  
19 We are making some strong assumptions to simplify our model. We are assuming individuals decide to share 
when the personal  output gains from  sharing exceed the personal disutility. To focus on internal development of 
connective capital we ignore the incentive pay as part of the model. We assume each worker earns a  base wage Wi  
that reflects their skills and attracts them to the firm. The capital gains from sharing are offset by the disputing of 
sharing,  and  therefore  there  is  no  incentive  compatibility  constraint  in  our  model  that  encourages  the  workers 
decisions to stay with the firm as a function of his incentive pay disutility of sharing. We assume that workers are 
tied to the firm and that firms do not choose the skill set of workers. Clearly in the long run, workers do decide 
whether to work at the firm and firms choose the skill set of workers. Clearly, workers that have a low durability of 
sharing will be attracted to high sharing firms.   11 
Worker i will ask for help when the marginal expected benefits exceed marginal costs:  
(7)    P if 1 ji
A
i ij ij B A     
so that worker i will ask as a function of the probability that worker j will share.  
In large social networks as is the case in many firms, a worker will often have limited 
information about whether some specific co-worker will share. However, the worker will have 
information about the typical level of sharing he sees around him and he uses this information to 
assess the elements of (7). That is, the asking worker i does not know worker j, so he is assessing 
the  probability  that  j  will  share,  or    1 | 1   ij ji e A S P   from  (6)  assuming  i  knows  the 
elements of (6). As in (6), worker i knows two things about j: he knows worker j‘s skills so that i 
knows the value of Bij, and he knows the distribution of sharing costs,   
s
j f   across all j workers. 
If sharing costs in the firm fall because the distribution of   
s
j f   shifts to the left, then the 
probability of sharing rises and the probability of asking rises. In the next section, we introduce 
the firm‘s influence on costs, and thus, alter levels of networking in their firm. 
The model implies a very simple form of contagion effects in networking: the more you 
see others share (or high probability of sharing), the more you will ask for help. The probability 
that a communication link is formed is given by pr(Aij=1 and Sji=1) = 1, or:  
(8)  pr(ccij) = 1 =          












A d f d f B F P B F
0 0 ) (      
That is, if the probability of sharing rises, that will raise the probability of asking, and thus raise 
the amount of connective capital.  
Equation  (8)  gives  the  conditions  under  which  workers  invest  in  forming  connective 
capital.    Connective  capital  increases  with  increases  in  the  net  productivity  benefits  (Bij  = 
N HC HC HC d j j i i j ij / )] ( R[       )  generated  by  info rmation  sharing.  Therefore, 
individual investment in connective capital is governed by the following  (see Appendix A for 
derivations): 
   12 
1.  Benefits of forming connective capital are increasing in the value of problem solving, or 
ij  .  The more productive that the problem solving activity is for the firm, the more that 










2.  High  levels  of personal  human capital, HCj,  can increase  connective capital  (all else 
constant)  because  human  capital  increases  the  benefits  of  problem  solving: 





    


.   
 
3.  High levels of personal human capital, HCj, can also decrease connective capital (all else 
constant)  because  benefits  are  decreasing  in  αj,  the  output  gain  from  individual 
performance. The more productive that individuals are when they are working on their 











 , for all j; 
20 
  Higher levels of human capital raise both the (opportunity) costs and (producti vity) 
benefits of problem solving since workers with more human capital are more productive when 
they work on their own and when they problem solve with others : connective capital rises with 
human  capital  when  j ij d    .  Despite  these  opposing  effects,  problem  solving  and 
connective capital will increase with increases in human capital as long as there is some positive 
benefit to sharing expert knowledge as described next.  
  It‘s important to recall an assumption we made to keep the model simple.  We assumed 
that  the  HCj  differ  across  the  j=1.,,N  individuals  in  the  firm:  we  assumed  that  firms  are 
                                                            
20 While we focus on the prediction from the model about the effects of individual human capital on connective 
capital formation since the data for this study allow us to examine this prediction, comparati ve statics from the 
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* If all workers had the same type of general human capital, there would be no reason to tap into the skills of others 
to solve your own problems as they arise. See Lazear and Shaw (2008) for a model of the value of experts versus 
generalists in teamwork.      13 
collections of experts.  Therefore, connective capital is higher in when the variance of skills is 
high across firms – when the firm is comprised of high-level experts (Lazear and Shaw, 2007).
21   
When are firms most likely to be comprised of experts  developing connective capital?  
New technologies might be more likely to be associated with firms that are teams of experts, 
because in new technologies, rapid evolution of information makes it difficult for any one person 
to have an absolute advantage in everything.  Then, as technologies mature, very talented 
individuals may, over time, acquire knowledge in a multitude of skills, makin g connective 
capital lower because the firm is composed of generalists and is more hierarchical.
22 Firms that 
are exploring new areas of innovative problems will have a flat flexible structure with high levels 
of connective capital. Firms that are explo iting existing product brand value will be more 
hierarchical, with generalists making decisions alone dominating the firm‘s structure.
23         
 
D. The Firm’s Influence on its Workers’ Connective Capital 
The model of connective capital formation implies underinvestment in this shared human 
capital because of the standard free-rider problem: the benefits from information sharing are 
divided among the group of N workers in the group-based incentive pay (Kandel and Lazear, 
1992).  Therefore, firms with high values to problems solving, or high ʴij, will find it in their best 
interest to find ways of influencing workers to increase their investments in connective capital.  
Assuming that workers and their skills are fixed in the short run, we focus on how the firm uses 
its organizational practices to alter workers‘ costs of asking and sharing.   
We begin by letting the workers‘ costs of communication be a function of a workplace 
―culture‖ that determines norms about information sharing among workers.
24  In firms that have 
                                                            
21 The variance of skills is critical : when worker i faces a problem he cannot solve with his HC i , there must be 
another person j with different HCi  who can solve the problem. If one person is a generalist who knows everything 
he will not call upon others. Firms do not hire generalists because they are to costly to hire given the problem firms 
face. 
22 Connective capital is a model  of team problem solving, not one of hierarchical control.  Connective capital 
emphasizes problem solving, not decision-making.  When person i is faced with a problem to solve, he gathers the 
advice of others and makes a recommendation. In a flat organization, these recommendations would be followed.  In 
a hierarchical organization, these recommendations might not be followed: For models of hierarchy, see Garicano 
(2000).  Note also that the volume of communications may be very high in the hierarchical firms, as information is 
passed up to the hierarchy.  Our model of connective capital is a model of the ‗direct‖ communication links between 
people.  A complete network analysis would follow the ―indirect links‖ between people at different levels of the firm 
to fully map the communications network in a hierarchy.  
23 For models of ―explorer‖ and ―exploiter‖ firms, see the strategy literature of Saloner, Shepard, Podolny (1999). 
24 Firms will introduce additional HR practices to increase sharing that are not modeled in this paper. These include 
individual pay for teamwork, or training for expert skills and teamwork. Moreover, we assume no incentive pay for 
individual effort (no βʱi HCi) for increase β>0).   14 
a culture where sharing is typical and expected, the SharingNorm is high and there are low costs 
of sharing (or personal  disutility of sharing)  because  workers  get positive reinforcement for 
sharing. Represent this effect of the sharing norm on the distribution of workers‘ sharing costs 
by: 




j    ,  where γsj<0 
Equation (9) simply states that higher norms reduce the workers‘ sharing costs. The model here 
is  in  the  spirit  of  Kandel  and  Lazear‘s  (1992)  model  of  peer  pressure  in  which  workers 
experience added costs when they fall below the group‘s effort norm.  Other models in which 
worker effort or utility is affected by behavior in the work group include Akerlof and Kranton‘s 
(2003) model of self-image and identity in which a worker‘s personal utility is higher when his 
self image matches the firm‘s ideal behavior for its employees.   
 
We  now  allow  firms  to  develop  higher  sharing  norms  by  investing  in  various  HR 
practices that promote a culture of teamwork and information sharing among workers.  The 
distribution of the workers‘ costs of sharing, conditional on workplace culture about sharing, 
becomes:  
 
 (10)  f(
S
j  SharingNorm) = f(
S
j  HR=practices that create norms about sharing) 
 
Sharing Norm in (10) is the firm‘s desired level of sharing which exceeds the value of the norm 
in the absence of high returns to problem solving.  In many firms today, human resource policies 
are  used  to  build  a  sharing  norm  by  encouraging  teamwork  and  sharing:  firms  indoctrinate 
workers with a teamwork norm during the selection process, during orientation at time of entry, 
during on-going labor-management communications and meetings, or during supervision after 
the time of hire.  Firms that have a high value to problem solving will introduce these practices 
that emphasize the sharing norm.  Firms that have a high value to independent activity will not.    15 
 
    Fig. 1a: Sharing Costs with HR=HR0 = 0 
 
 
   Fig. 1b: Sharing Costs with HR=HR1>HR0 
 
   Fig. 1c: Sharing Costs with HR=HR2>HR1 
 




Shifts in the Distribution of Communication Costs Under Successively Higher “Sharing Norms”   16 
Figures 1a-1d illustrate the decrease in sharing costs that occur as the firm makes greater 
HR investments to promote a higher sharing norm.  In the figure, the benefits of connective 
capital, Bij, are fixed.  As the distribution of costs is progressively shifted left due to HR practices 
that increase the SharingNorm, as a greater proportion of the sharing cost distribution lies below 
the benefits.  Given the bell-shaped distribution and very high initial sharing costs, there is a 
huge acceleration in sharing between Figures 1a and 1b when the entire distribution of costs 
shifts left, and then as costs are lowered further in Figures 1c and 1d, sharing goes up, but it goes 
up at a lower rate.  The increase in sharing rises rapidly and then tapers.   
While  higher  sharing  norms  will  promote  connective  capital  formation,  the  human 
resource practices that the firm adopts to establish a higher sharing norm are not free. When the 
firm invests in HR policies to establish a pro-sharing culture in any given period t, it bears two 
costs in that period – the costs of the policies that raise the norm, and the increased opportunity 
cost of the employees‘ communications time when additional sharing occurs.
25  In period t+1, the 
firm earns returns to these investments in the form of productivity increases from the connective 
capital problem solving activity. The expected present value of the firm‘s profit over the period 
of investment and the period of increased productivity is given by:  
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where (1-R) is the percent of the firm‘s net revenues reserved for shareholders, W is fixed wage 
bill and material costs, ηHR are the costs of HR initiatives that cultivate workplace sharing norm  
culture, d is the discount factor (1/(1+r)) for the second period profits, and αHC measures output 
obtained when workers use their own human capital to produce independently. From equation 
(5), Bij (N/R) captures the net gain of the (i,j) communication. 
Redefine the probability that workers i and j will form a communication link and share 
human capital from equation (8) above to be conditional on HR: 
 




ij   ) 1 (   
                                                            
25 To simplify the presentation here, we assume that that the depreciation factor for own human capital in equation 
(2) above is zero, as seems reasonable if the worker is working throughout the period.  We also continue to assume 
that the memory factor for any acquired connective capital is  zero (i.e., connective capital is only ―borrowed‖), an 
assumption which reduces the benefits of connective capital and would work against connective capital formation.   17 
 
Therefore, the expected net revenue gains to the firm for any i,j sharing relationship are defined 
as Yij: 
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A comparison  of the  gains  in  net  revenue and  the costs of HR  determine the firm‘s 
optimal HR investment. Figure 2 illustrates this decision. Under the assumptions that f
A=fs and 
that
    HR f   is lognormal with mean
HR
1
 , the plot of Yij  as a function of HR, assuming a 
fixed level of Bij, is the cumulative distribution of a lognormal density function which Figure 2 
labels as the ―Net Revenue Gain‖ curve.  When the firm increases the HR Index to promote a 
culture of sharing, it raises the value of the sharing norm, and the entire communication cost 
distribution shifts left, as shown above in the progressive movements from Figure 1a to 1d. The 
probability of sharing increases, as does the probability of asking because it depends on the 
average  level  of  sharing  observed  in  the  firm.  This  increase  in  information  sharing  due  to 
increases in HR then produces the nonlinear increase in the Net Revenue Gain for higher values 
of HR that is shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Net Revenue Gains to Investing in Connective Capital Relative to the HR Costs   18 
 
Given these gains in net revenues that occur as HR increases, the optimal value of HR for 
the firm then depends on the costs of HR.  Figure 2 displays several possible functions for costs 
associated with increasing the sharing norm, HR.  Cost 1- Cost 3 in Figure 2 show three linear 
cost functions that are successively higher.  
The firm  selects  the level  of HR  which maximizes  expected present  value of profits 
where marginal costs, or η, are equal to marginal benefits. Thus, the optimal level of HR occurs 
where the slope of the revenue function is equal to the slope of the cost function, as long as net 
revenue is above costs. Figure 2 implies that firms will tend to choose extreme positions with 
either little or no investment in cultivating a pro-sharing culture (and correspondingly low levels 
of connective capital), or fairly high levels of HR (with correspondingly high connective capital), 
because the benefit function accelerates and then plateaus.  For example, given cost function 
Cost 2, the optimal investment in HR is either zero or HR* across all firms along Cost 2.  The 
conclusion that firms will tend to have either high or low levels of connective capital is a result 
of the non-linearity of the expected gains function, described above in Figure 1 as the firm 
progressively raises HR to shift costs lower.  
Of course, firms that have a high return to problem solving, or high ʴij, can increase 
connective capital using other mechanisms in the long run.  They can select workers who are 
skilled at communicating and collaborating, not just skilled at design or operations.  Firms that 
are comprised of experts working on team-based problem solving often report that they look for 
collaboration skills in hiring.  Firms will also want to hire more experts, or train more on the job 
for human capital skills or sharing skills.  
 
E. Summary of the Model’s Assumptions and Implications 
  The model of connective capital makes the following overall predictions: 
Connective capital increases productivity when the production function values problem 
solving  by  a  collection  of  experts.  Individuals  invest  in  connective  capital  when  the 
productivity  increases  from  team  problem  solving,  or  high   ,  are  greater  than  the 
productivity the firm would obtain when employees worked independently.    19 
Workers invest in connective capital when the asking and sharing costs of communicating 
are low. The level of human capital, ʱiHCi, has an ambiguous effect on connective capital. 
However, the more the firm is comprised of experts, rather than generalists who solve their 
own problems, the greater the connective capital.  
The  Firm’s  HR  practices  can  elevate  connective  capital  formation.  The  firm‘s  HR 
practices  shape  workplace  culture.    This  culture  can  offer  positive  reinforcement  to 
workers when they share ideas about how to solve problems, and thus can decrease the 
employees‘ costs of making connections and creating connective capital. 
 
Distinctive  features  of  this  model  of  teamwork  are  related  to  the  fact  that  firms  are 
comprised of groups of experts.  The model describes one reason why a worker would share 
knowledge with a co-worker even in a large social setting like a big firm where the worker is not 
likely to be personally rewarded by that co-worker. Furthermore, HR  policies that influence 
norms of behavior for the group are also important determinants of this productivity-enhancing 
problem solving and the ultimate level of connective capital is likely to be either at low or high 
levels in the group.  
 
II.  Empirical Evidence on Connective Capital Using Data from Steel Mills 
The predictions of the section II model can be summarized as follows: human resource 
practices and worker characteristics determine the extent of connective capital which in turn 
affects  the  firm‘s  level  of  productivity.    Previous  studies  offer  empirical  support  for  the 
proposition that systems of Team-Oriented HR practices increase productivity in a number of 
industries.
26  Connective capital can be a critical intervening variable that helps explain the link 
between Team-Oriented organizational practices and increased productivity: firms with  Team-
Oriented HR practices are more productive because workers and firms invest more in connective 
capital to solve problems. To test the full set of implications from the model would require a 
                                                            
26 Positive effects of Team-Oriented HR practices on productivity are observed in industry-specific studies including 
MacDuffie (1995) for auto assembly, Dunlop and Weil (1997)  and Berg, Appelbaum, Bailey and Kalleberg (1996)  
for apparel and textile manufacturing, Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw ( 2008) for steel minimills; and in studies of 
cross-industry samples of establishments including Black and Lynch (2001), Cappelli and Neumark (2001) and 
Huselid (1995).   20 
unique data set that included information on workers‘ communications, workers‘ characteristics, 
HR policies of firms, the technology of the firm to measure the firm‘s value placed on problem 
solving activities, and the productivity of firms. Such rich data are not available.  However, 
through  new  data  collection  and  previous  research,  we  will  address  the  links  from  human 
resource practices, to connective capital, to productivity.   
We collected data on the communications networks and skills of 642 workers on seven 
steel finishing lines.
27 Three of these lines are characterized by ―Team-Oriented HR practices‖ 
such as the use of problem-solving teams, information sharing between managers and workers, 
high training and group-based incentive pay.  The other four lines are characterized by more 
―Traditional HR practices‖ that do not emphasize team work and information sharing.
28  The 
production environment was described in section IB above: workers are operating comparable 
steel production lines in which flat-rolled coiled steel is going through a continuous production  
line in which the steel is coated or processed.   The mill is more productive when the quantity of 
steel coming off the line is higher per unit of steel input.   
In  previous  work,  we  show  that  mills  with  team-orientated  production  are  more 
productive in a large sample of 36 steel mills (Ichniowski, Shaw, Prennushi, 1997). Productivity 
is measured as ―uptime‖ – the percent of time the line is running when it is scheduled to run. 
Mills with the set of Team-Oriented practices have a predicted uptime of 95%, based on our 
regressions. In contrast, Traditional lines have a predicted uptime of 90%. This five percentage 
point difference arises from the differences in HR practices. These are very large differences 
monetarily. We suspect that Team-Oriented lines achieve performance gains due to higher levels 
of  connective  capital  for  solving  uptime  performance  problems.  It  would  be  impossible  to 
survey all workers in all these mills, so we survey all 642 workers in seven representative mills.  
Our  aim  is  to  look  for  patterns  of  individual  investment  in  connective  capital  among  these 
workers,  and  to  look  for  differences  in  connective  capital  across  the  two  different  HR 
environments.    
                                                            
27These data were collected in collaboration with Jon Gant for Gant, Ichniowski, and Shaw (2002). 
28 Each of the lines with  Team-Oriented HR practices has: group-based incentive pay for quality output, broadly 
defined job; formal processes for informative sharing, formal procedures for participation in problem-solving teams, 
high levels of training in skills and problem solving techniques,  and careful selection of new employees who have 
the skills and positive attitude towards group work.  These finishing lines  with Traditional HR practices  are all 
characterized by a set of HR practices including: more  narrowly defined jobs, communication largely managed 
through  conventional  grievance  procedures,  hiring  largely  through  employee  referrals  with  limited  pre -hire 
screening, on-the-job training but with no training in teamwork skills.    21 
A. Data and Sample  
Section II defines each individual‘s connective capital as the knowledge he obtained from 
other  co-workers  in  the  firm.  We  conduct  worker  surveys  in  these  seven  finishing  lines  to 
measure workers‘ communications to address operating problems. We also collect data on the 
education and tenure of workers from a subsample of workers as proxies for their level of human 
capital. Finally we measure whether mills have organizational HR practices supporting problem 
solving. 
The Worker Survey and Communication Data 
Appendix  B  shows  a  sample  of  the  worker  survey  used  to  collect  data  about 
communication among the workers on the lines. The worker communication survey has three 
main  features.  First,  it  lists  the  names  of  every  worker  with  responsibilities  for  running  or 
managing the line and asks the employee put a check mark next to the name of each person with 
whom he communicates.  Second, respondents identify the frequency of their interaction with 
other workers for the various communication topics.  The three categories are ―daily‖, ―weekly‖, 
or ―monthly,‖ and no check mark indicates that the workers communicate less than monthly or 
not at all. Third, as the respondent checks off these names, the survey asks employees to identify 
the topic area of the communications with other employees: operation-related issues, customer-
related issues, and work routines. Survey responses were obtained from all line workers by going 
to the seven mills and handing out and picking up the survey from all workers.  
Human Capital Measures 
  Data on the demographic characteristics related to human capital were available for a 
subsample of the workers surveyed.  This information includes years of schooling and highest 
degree attained, age, and years of tenure at the mill location.  We use these measures in the 
empirical work as proxies for the level of human capital that co-workers can tap into when they 
establish communication links with each other. 
Sample Size 
There are typically about 90 workers per line, ranging from 87 to 118 workers.  The 
number of blue-collar workers – operators and maintenance workers – ranges from 47 to 51 
workers across most lines.  Samples in regression analyses below include responses for up to 642   22 
employees across the seven lines.  All line workers completed communication surveys, though in 
some analyses there are missing observations primarily due to missing data on the human capital 
measures. 
B. Hypotheses 
Our  data  dictates  which  hypotheses  are  testable.  We  first  use  the  worker-specific 
communications data that we collect from these seven lines to test for differences in the level of 
communication under Team-Oriented HR practices versus more Traditional HR practices.  Next, 
we examine communication patterns as a function of differences in the characteristics of the 
workers. Because the lines have nearly identical technologies and production processes, the data 
are not suited to tests of other hypotheses from the model, such as the effects of differences in 
value of problem solving (i.e., δ in the section II model) on worker communications. Based on 
plant visits, we assume that all there will have a high value to problem solving, or high   Some 
will have Team-oriented HR practices and some do not because transition to new HR costs are 
high
  F.
  We  test  only  whether  those  plants  having  Team-oriented  HR  also  have  the 
communication links that would reflect high levels of connective capital. 
 
Hypothesis H1: At the firm level, steel mills that have Team-Oriented HR practices that 
promote  information  sharing  and  problem  solving  will  have  greater  amounts  of 
connective capital among workers.
29   
 
Hypothesis H2a: At the individual level, connective capital could be higher or lower for 
workers with high levels of HCi,  when the highly skilled offer expert skills others lack. 
The variable HCi is unobserved in most data sets, so some potential proxies education 
and tenure for it are considered. 
 
Hypothesis H2b: At the individual level, connective capital will be higher for workers 
with low costs of communicating, all else constant.  Workers near each other physically 
                                                            
F   The costs of organizational transformation are the costs of changing all the HR Practices; job design, incentives, 
etc.  In  the  five  years  that  we  follow  36  miles,  none  of  the  mills  succeeded  in  changing  all  of  their  practices 
(Ichniowski and Shaw, 1995) 
29 Because the  Team-Oriented and Traditional lines have entirely different sets of HR practices, we cannot test 
whether there are specific HR practices that are used to enhance the development of connective capital.  For 
example, we cannot test whether any observed differences in communication and connective capital mills are due to 
selection policies (e.g., selecting workers who enjoy teamwork and would therefore have low communication costs) 
or to a training program (e.g., developing workers‘ solving skills which would also encourage connective capital 
development).     23 
should communicate more, because it is easier (or less costly) to communicate with those 
near you, and also because workers near each other can exert more peer pressure on each 
other to share ideas.   
 
C. The Firm’s HR Policies and Differences in Connective Capital 
  This section reports three kinds of evidence about hypothesis H1 testing for differences in 
connective  capital  under  Team-Oriented  vs.  Traditional  HR  practices.    We  show  network 
diagrams of communication patterns among the workers in different lines; descriptive statistics 
on communications and connective capital for workers in different lines; and estimates from 
regression models that express a worker‘s total number of communication links as a function of 
the plant‘s HR policies. 
Network Diagrams 
In Figures 3 and 4, we present the first evidence on differences in worker communication 
under different HR practices.
30  These figures show a series of network diagrams that depict the 
existence of communication links among workers in lines that have Team-Oriented HR practices 
and in lines that have Traditional HR practices. In Figures 3 and 4, any line drawn between two 
workers indicates that a communication about an operations issue occurred between those two 
workers.  For  the  purpose  of  these  illustrative  figures,  we  restrict  our  attention  to  two 
representative  lines  with  Team-Oriented  HR  practices  and   two  representative  lines  with 
Traditional practices.  These figures depict the communications network links between workers 
when the worker pairs have discussed the operating problems of the steel mill on a daily, weekly, 
or monthly.  
Figures  3a-3d  show  dramatically  higher  amounts  of  communication  between  the 
operators within the crews of the lines with Team-Oriented HR practices compared to the lines 
with traditional HR practices. The finishing lines in our sample run continuously, and allowing 
for days off during the week, four operator crews (A, B, C and D crews) are required to man the 
line  on  a  continuous  basis.    Crew  sizes  range  from  6  to  10  at  these  sites.  Nearly  all  crew 
members in these lines communicate with 70% to 100% of employees on their own crews.  In 
                                                            
30 These same network figures for steel mills are also presented  in Gant, Ichniowski, and Shaw (2002) when  the 
emphasis was on showing that  organizational change in steel mills  must be accompanied by changes in soc ial 
networks.  In this  current paper on connective capital we go beyond the previous paper by modeling individual 
decisions to communicate in our theoretical model and in our new regressions on communications patterns.     24 
contrast, Figures 4c and 4d for the lines with traditional HR practices reveal a much lower extent 
of within-crew interaction.
 31   On Traditional line 2, between 10% to 15% of all possible within-
crew ties exist in the four crews.  Furthermore, out of 35 operators across the four crews at 
Traditional line 1, there are 20 workers who communicate with either no other crew workers or 
one other crew worker on his own crew.  Similarly, on Traditional line 2, 67% of the crew 
operators across the four crews communicate with two or fewer fellow crew members.  These 
network diagrams paint a clear picture – operators on the Traditional lines are doing their jobs on 
their own. 
Figures 4a-4d display the amount of communication between crews and groups.  Each 
network diagram shows eight nodes—one each for the four crews and for maintenance workers, 
foremen, management, and staff.  High levels of inter-group interaction (indicated with bold 
lines) exist when at least 60 percent of all possible two-person links between the two groups 
exist.
32  Medium levels of interaction (indicated w ith thin lines) mean that between 36% and 
59% of all possible two -person links across the two groups exist. Low levels of interaction 
(indicated with dashed lines) mean that no more than 35% of all possible ties across the two 
groups exist. 
  These results and the regression results below are consistent with hypothesis H1:  These 
inter-group network diagrams show dramatically higher levels of communications between 
different crews and between operating crews and maintenance on the  Team-Oriented  lines 
compared  to the  Traditional lines.  For T raditional line 1, the average of this cross -group 
communication percentage is 23.1%, and the range is from a lo w of 9% to a high of 42%.  For 
Traditional line 2, the average cross-department communication percent for these five blue-collar 
worker groups is only 10%, ranging from a low of 0% to a high of only 19%.  In contrast for the 
Team-Oriented lines, the average cross-crew percent among production and maintenance worker 
                                                            
31 At Team-Oriented line 1, the average crew member communicates about operations issues with 86% fellow crew 
members on the A crew, 78% on the B crew, 90% on the C crew, and 61% on the D crew.  For  Team-Oriented line 
2, the corresponding figures for the four crews are 76%, 86%, 70% and 73%.   On traditional line 1, the A crew has 
the highest level of intra-crew interaction of any crew at either of the two traditional lines at 44% of all possible 
intra-crew ties, but this is only about half the level of communication for the IO line crews.  Fo r the other three 
crews at traditional line 1, an average crew member communicates with only 12% of his fellow crew members on 
the B crew, 19% on the C crew, and 16% on the D crew.     
32 We calculate this ―average‖ level of inter-group interaction by first determining the number of possible worker-to-
worker ties between any two groups.  For example, the total number of possible two-person ties between the six-
person A crew and the six-person B crew at IO line 1 is 36 ties.  The actual number of two-person ties between the 
A and B crews divided by the 36 potential ties gives the percentage for the inter-group level of interaction for those 
two groups.     25 
groups is 76.2% at Team-Oriented line 1 and 71.6% at Team-Oriented line 2.  Across both of 
these lines, these cross-crew percentages range from a low of 53% (or, 11 percentage points 
above  the  maximum  cross-crew  percent  at  either  traditional  line)  to  a  high  of  90%. 
Communication  among  production  workers  on  the  same  crew  and  among  operators  and 
maintenance workers on different crews is much more extensive in lines with Team-Oriented HR 
practices than it is in lines with Traditional HR practices.  
Summary Statistics on Human Capital and Connective Capital under Different HR Practices 
  In this section, we test Hypothesis 2a and find that the typical measure of workers human 
capital are uncorrelated with connective capital. Table 1 presents summary statistics on typical 
human capital measures and measures of workers‘ connective capital.  The typical human capital 
measures of education and tenure are displayed in rows 1 through 4.  A workers‘ connective 
capital is measured three different ways.  Row 5 measures connective capital by calculating the 
percent of all workers in the line with whom the given worker has a direct ―tie.‖ In terms of the 
parameters of the section 2 model, this is the percent of all ccij‘s that equal one for worker i, or: 
                     N 
  Connective Capital ―Tie%‖i     ≡   (CC Tie%)i   ≡    ccij  /N 
                                          ji 
 
Because steel lines have slightly different numbers of employees, we normalize the tie percent 
statistic by the overall size of the steel line (N).  Rows 6 and 7 measure connective capital by 
weighting each workers‘ communications link by the skill levels of the workers in the link:
33 in 
row 6, links are weighted be the workers‘ years of education and in row 7, links are weighted by 
the the total number of years of tenure of co-workers or: 
                   N 
  ―Aggregate‖ Connective Capitali   ≡  CCi   ≡    ccij HCj  
                                ji 
 
                                                            
33 The section II model defines a worker‘s connective capital (CCi) as a vector of ccij*HCj elements.  One can 
interpret this ―aggregate connective capital‖ measure as the value of δ'CC when we set the δ vector, which measures 
the value of problem solving, equal to one.   26 
where ccij  equals one if worker i communicates with worker j and zero otherwise, and HCj is 
measured alternatively by the number of years of experience or education of worker j.  These 
connective capital measures formed with human capital links as weights are aims to measure the 
quality of knowledge passed between workers.   
The  results  show  that  workers  in  Team-Oriented  lines  have  much  higher  levels  of 
connective capital than do Traditional HR lines, when connective capital is measured in any of 
the ways displayed in  rows 5, 6, or 7 of Table 1.  In complete contrast, there is absolutely no 
difference in the means or distributions of education and tenure in the Team-Oriented versus 
Traditional HR lines.  Using the typical measures of human capital (education and tenure) we see 
no apparent differences in skills on these lines.  But the much higher degree of connective capital 
in  Team-Oriented  lines  suggests  workers  are  tapping  into  each  others‘  knowledge  to  solve 
operating problems, and thus suggests these are teams of experts.  If a workers could solve his 
problem alone, with out the help of other workers with different expert knowledge, he would not 
make the effort in these mills to contact other employees on the steel line.  Like the network 
diagrams in Figures 3 and 4, these summary statistics also support hypothesis 1 that connective 
capital and information sharing among workers is higher when firms adopt HR practices that 
promote teamwork.  
Regression Estimates of the Determinants Connections Among Workers 
In  this  section  we  discuss  regression  results  that  confirm  Hypothesis  #1:  connective 
capital  is  higher  on  Team-oriented  lines  and  when  we  control  for  worker  characterized  of 
education tenure and occupation.
34  
On average, workers in Team-Oriented lines are connected with 17.5% more of their line 
workforce than are workers in traditional lines , based on a regression of workers‘ connective 
capital (measured as the tie percent) as a function of the Team-Oriented dummy variable and 
four occupation dummies as control variables (Table 2, column 1).
35  When the dummy for 
Team-Oriented HR is interacted with different occupational groups,  the results are the same: 
                                                            
34 See also Gant, Ichniowski, and Shaw (2002) for these regression results when examining organizational change in 
steel mills.   
35 The sample is stacked by frequency of contact (strong or daily ties; moderate or weekly ties; and weak or monthly 
ties) and by topic of contact (related to operations, to customers, or to work routines); thus the data set includes nine 
observations per worker in the ―all ties‖ columns, and three observations in the ―strong ties‖ columns. We include 
dummies for all four occupation groups but omit the constant term from the regression.   27 
workers in all occupational groups have significantly more connective capital in Team-Oriented 
lines (column 2).  More specifically, the largest percentage differential is for foremen and then 
production workers, and the smallest in magnitude for managers.  Team-Oriented HR practices 
elevate the connective capital  of operating workers more than managers.   These regressions 
displayed connective capital measures for all frequencies of communications (daily, weekly, and 
monthly).  When connective capital is measured for each of these frequencies, the results are the 
same, except that there is no difference in the amount of management communications between 
Team-Oriented  lines  and  Traditional  HR  lines:  managers  are  always  communicating  with 
workers on a daily basis in all the lines.
36   
In Table 3, we re -estimate these regressions but add controls  for the workers‘ human 
capital, as measured by education and tenure. The sample size in the Table 3 regressions is lower 
than the Table 2 sample size due to missing data on the individuals‘ education and tenure.  The 
basic patterns remain the same: the estimated effect of Team-Oriented HR practices on each 
worker‘s connective capital is independent of the effects of typical human capital variables in 
these workforces.   
Overall, patterns in the worker communication data demonstrate the HR environments 
have large and powerful effects on the extent of worker communication and interaction. Workers 
have more connective capital in lines with Team-Oriented HR practices compared to virtually 
identical finishing lines that operate under Traditional HR practices.  These data also show that 
connective  capital  is  very  distinct  from  human  capital  –  workers  with  equivalent  tenure  or 
education have very different connective  capital  depending largely on  the nature of the HR 
practices adopted by the lines.  Typical human capital measures like tenure and education are not 
good predictors of connective capital and are not likely to measure underlying expert skills. 
D. Who Talks to Whom?    
Lastly, we test Hypotheses 2a and 2b using data on who talks to whom.  The data set for 
Table 4 is the set of communications from all possible worker pairs in all the lines.  When there 
is a communication between a given pair of workers, then the dummy dependent variable, Tie, 
equals one.  If the workers do not have a communication connection, the dependent variable for 
                                                            
36 We also estimate regressions in which we omit observations in IO lines with very large numbers of ties to t est 
whether the positive IO effect is driven by the higher communications for a subset of the workforce. Even 
eliminating these outliers in IO lines, we find that the IO effect is very positive for all groups of workers.     28 
that pair equals zero.  We separate the data sets into the Team-Oriented communications (column 
1) and the Traditional HR communications (column 2).
37 
In  Team-Oriented  lines,  there  is  some  evidence  that  experts  communicate  more 
(Hypotheses 2a) and that physical proximity matters (Hypothesis 2b) .   Communications are 
higher within the occupation groups  – within manager-manager pairs, operator-operator pairs, 
and  within  maintenance-maintenance  pairs.
38  These  communications  could  reflect  higher 
comfort levels for workers talking with the own kind.  But more specifically, they show that 
within occupation groups, workers communicate with each other because they  believe each 
worker has different expert knowledge (Hypothesis 2a): if the worker could solve his operating 
problem alone, he would not communicate.  Plant visits to observe problem -solving in the steel 
mill lines, and interviews, confirmed this interpretation.   
Physical proximity also raises communications  (Hypothesis 2b):  maintenance workers 
communicate with each other the most because they work out of a base ―shop‖ in a part of the 
mill.  All other workers are located at different points along the production line.   
Turning to the regressions for Traditional HR lines, virtually no one talks to each other.  
The level of the coefficients on the job class types are much smaller than for Team-Oriented 
lines.    Operators  do  not  appear  to  be  considered  as  experts  with  knowledge  to  share. 
Maintenance workers also do not communicate with each other – they just take orders from 
above.  One variable that is more significant is tenure: tenure groups seem to stick together.  The 
older workers on the line are more likely to talk to each other (measured by the ―both senior‖ 
dummy variable).   
In sum, we show that operators and maintenance workers talk more to each other on 
Team-Oriented lines. Apparently, they value their expert skills despite the apparent homogeneity 
of their occupational titles. Workers on Traditional lines are also likely to have expert skills, but 
the HR practices of Traditional HR lines do not support the sharing of information to solve 
problems.  
                                                            
37 For the Team-Oriented results of column 1, the sample size is small because we drop the line that does not have 
jobs  designated  ―supervisor‖  but  instead  uses  team  leaders  among  the  operators.    When  looking  at  detailed 
communications pairs, we aimed for very homogeneous measures of occupation.   
38 The omitted occupation pair is maintenance-manager, because these workers need to communicate to maintain the 
capital on the line.   29 
These results also show that economists do not have reasonable measures of the ―expert 
skills‖ of employees.  Job class does not measure expert knowledge.  The individual workers on 
the line do know who to turn to when faced with a problem, but our data does not measure such 
expert knowledge.  This is not just true of data on steel mills, but all data sets where we use 
occupation as a measure of knowledge.   
 
E.  Linking Connective Capital to Productivity 
  The  theoretical  model  proposes  that  connective  capital  will  raise  the  productivity  of 
workers when problem solving is valued. At the beginning of Section II, we refer to the previous 
work showing that Team-Oriented lines have significantly higher productivity than Traditional 
lines for 36 steel mills (Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi, 1997). We return to seven of these 
mills in this paper surveying individual workers‘ communications. In this subset, seven mills is 
too  few  mills  to  test  whether  connective  capital  raises  productivity  (because  productivity  is 
measured at the mill level not the worker level). However, because these mills are drawn from 
the  larger  sample,  we  do  know  that  Team-Oriented  lines  are  much  more  productive  than 
Traditional  HR  lines,  and  the  clearly  higher  levels  of  connective  capital  to  solve  operative 
problems is a likely explanation for the higher productivity of Team environments.
39 
 
III. Conclusion  
Firms nowadays are likely to be using problem-solving extensively to produce output. In 
manufacturing,  gone  are  the  days  when  most  workers  only  stood  on  a  production  line  and 
manually fitted together products; now they also solve production problems together. Knowledge 
workers, as in the software industry or other professional service industries, will spend a portion 
of their time solving co-workers problems. One piece of evidence that firms are now comprised 
of problem solvers comes from Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003). They show, using detailed 
occupational task data for individuals over the last thirty years, that virtually all growth in labor 
demand has been for workers who do ―non-routine cognitive tasks‖ – i.e., problem solving. 
                                                            
39 For an explanation of why many mills don‘t adopt Team practices due to the high transformation costs, see 
Ichniowski and Shaw (1999).   30 
We posit that much of this problem solving occurs through knowledge sharing among 
experts. That is, firms are more likely to be comprised of different ―experts‖ who must share 
information to solve problems. Firms are not composed of generalists who know it all and work 
alone. This creates a new form of capital that workers and firms invest in, called connective 
capital. Each worker‘s individual connective capital is  the skills he taps into among his co-
workers. There  are two reasons why this notion of connective capital  is of interest. First, it 
defines a new production function that goes beyond traditional models (such as Cobb-Douglas).  
Connective capital specifies how workers are complements and produce higher output when 
working together: connective capital defines firms as teams of complementary workers. Second, 
firms that value problem solving must invest in connective capital HR practices that support the 
development of connective capital. Individuals constantly make decisions about how to spend 
their time since the output from connective capital is team based; individual workers have too 
little incentive to share knowledge when co-workers ask for help solving problems. Firms can 
increase sharing by creating a culture of ―norms‖ of sharing: as in any group output, all share 
more, and all collectively reach a higher level of pay and performance. Our data from steel mills 
supports  this  proposition:  mills  with  an  active  set  of  Team-oriented  HR  practices  aimed  at 
producing a culture of sharing have higher levels of information sharing among operators. 
In sum, the model of connective capital that we develop in this paper is ultimately a 
model about teamwork in large group settings. Connective capital shares many features with 
related  group-based notion of social capital.  Like social capital, connective capital  can only 
occur in groups.  It generates externalities since sharing ideas and knowledge among workers is 
more  beneficial  to  the  entire  group  than  to  the  individual.  Cooperative  knowledge  sharing 
behavior can spread within the group as workers observe patterns of sharing behavior that the 
firm has encouraged through norms of sharing. Therefore, connective capital is a knowledge-
based variant of social capital that provides one reason why individuals in groups can be smarter 
and more productive than they are working on their own.  In short, connective capital represents 
a way to leverage the value of individual human capital and increase the returns from human 
capital for both workers and firms. 
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Appendix A: Comparative Statics 
 
 
This appendix derives the conclusions of Section I.C. 
 
For point 1: 











so Bij is decreasing in  j jHC t , therefore Pr(ccij=1) is decreasing in  j jHC t . 
 
For point 2: 









So Bij is increasing in  ij   and hence Pr(ccij=1) is increasing in  ij  . 
 
For point 3, recall that 
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Therefore, when  j ij t d    , Bij is increasing in HCj. Hence communication is more common 
when  j ij t d    . 
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Note that  j ij t d     is not a real restriction because for a communication to be profitable for the 
firm in the first place, we must have Bij > 0, and this implies that   j j ij HC t d     and  i iHC t  
from its definition.   37 
 
Appendix B - Summary of Communication Survey Questions 
 
Here is a summary of the questions that are included in the communication survey.  The survey is 
relatively easy to fill out and takes between 10-15 minutes. The survey is organized with one question per 
page.  The rest of the page contains the names of all of the employees.  Beside each employee name are 
three check boxes indicating the frequency of communication.  Each respondent will be asked to read 
each question and place a check mark by the name of each employee‘s name that meet the question‘s 
criteria. 
 
For example, below is a brief illustration of one page from the survey.  
 
With whom do you typically communicate? 
 
       
Please check as many names as may be appropriate. 
 
  Daily  Weekly  Monthly or less  Daily  Weekly  Monthly or 
less 
Adams, Fred  [    ]  [    ]  [    ]    Hurley, Stanley  [    ]  [    ]  [    ]   
Christopheson, Bill  [    ]  [    ]  [    ]    Marshall, Jim  [    ]  [    ]  [    ]   
Haynes, Lester  [    ]  [    ]  [    ]    Smith, Don  [    ]  [    ]  [    ]   
Lieman, Mary  [    ]  [    ]  [    ]    Norville, David Jr.  [    ]  [    ]  [    ]   
Jordan, Barb  [    ]  [    ]  [    ]    Ostertag, John  [    ]  [    ]  [    ]   
Childs, Tim  [    ]  [    ]  [    ]    Patton, Mike  [    ]  [    ]  [    ]   
 
 
The survey questions include: 
 
1.  With whom do you typically communicate? 
2.  Who do you communicate with about operational issues? 
3.  Who do you communicate with about safety issues? 
4.  Who do you communicate with about quality issues? 
5.  Who do you communicate with about maintenance issues? 
6.  Who do you communicate with about customer issues? 
7.  Who do you communicate with about supplier issues? 
8.  Who do you communicate with about job related routines that you have developed? 
9.  Who do you communicate with about the performance of the company issues? 
10. Who are you dependent on for critical information in doing your job? 
11. Who is dependent on you for critical information in doing their job? 
12. How much training would you need to fill-in for the following employees 
13. With whom would you feel comfortable filling-in for you? 
 
All of the surveys will be handed out by the research team along with an envelope.  The respondents will 
be instructed to return the survey in this envelope and seal it to members of the research team.  This will 
help to protect the confidentiality of the responses. 
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Table 1 
 
Mean Values Human Capital Variables and Connective Capital Indicators  
 
 
  Type of HR Practices 
 
Measure of Human Capital 







     
1. Years of Schooling  13.26  13.22   
       
2. Percent High School Grad or Less  56%  59%   
       
3. Percent with Some College Degree  17%  20%   
       





     
5. Connective Capital Tie % (Percent 
of Other Workers that Focal 






       
6. Aggregate Connective Capital, 









       
7. Aggregate Connective Capital, 











See the variable definitions in Section IIC. 
a- Standard deviations in parentheses 
b-Lines 6 and 7 present the average value (and standard deviation) for a statistic that sums the total 
number of years of the given human capital measure among workers with whom the focal worker 
has a tie. 
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                                                    Table 2 
Determinants of Connective Capital Tie% 
Dependent Variable = (No. of Ties)i/(Nplant) 
 
                      Connective Capital Tie% 
  All Ties  Strong Ties  Weak Ties 
  (1)   (2)  (3)   (4) 
                 
Production Workers  .092    .091    .062    .067   
  (6.28)    (10.88)    (8.12)    (6.58)   
                 
Managers  .078    .103    .071    .061   
  (4.39)    (6.30)    (6.41)    (4.03)   
                 
Non-Production Staff  .053    .064    .055    .039   
  (5.34)    (4.21)    (3.78)    (2.08)   
                 
Foremen/Team Leaders  .149    .084    .052    .047   
  (4.51)    (2.59)    (1.98)    (1.92)   
                 
Team-Oriented  .175               
HRM Practices (TEAM HR)  (15.18)               
                 
Production Workers*TEAM HR      .199    .118    .169   
      (13.47)    (5.57)    (9.65)   
                 
Managers*TEAM HR      .151    .023    .201   
      (5.44)    (1.50)    (5.96)   
                 
Non-production Staff*TEAM HR      .176    .114    .163   
      (7.65)    (3.19)    (7.42)   
                 
Foremen/Team Leader*TEAM HR      .283    .205    .253   
      (5.55)    (4.31)    (3.80)   
                 
R
2  0.49    0.50    0.37    0.55   
                 







All Ties refers to the daily, weekly, and monthly communications.  Strong ties refer only to daily 
communications. There are also three separate observations for each of three different communication 
topics.  Thus, samples for ―all ties‖ models contain 9 observations per employee and samples for strong 
ties models have 3 observations per employee.  Models include controls for type of communication topic 
and frequency of communication. 
 
Standard errors are adjusted for worker-specific clustering; t-statistics are in parentheses.  
 
   40 
Table 3 
Determinants of Connective Capital Tie% in Models with Controls for Workers’  Human Capital 
Dependent Variable = (No. of Ties)i/(Nplant) 
 
                    Connective Capital Tie% 
                            










Production Workers*TEAM HR  .211    .096    .198   
  (11.22)    (4.76)    (8.12)   
             
Managers*TEAM HR  .282    .098    .296   
  (7.89)    (3.52)    (5.65)   
             
Non-production Staff*TEAM HR  .260    .160    .250   
  (8.31)    (2.87)    (7.90)   
             
Foremen/Team Leader*TEAM HR  .323    .238    .289   
  (9.80)    (5.59)    (4.46)   
             
Age – Operators  .0003    -.0025    .0017   
  (0.25)    (-1.80)    (0.91)   
             
           Non-operators  -.0040    -.0043    -.0034   
  (-3.18)    (-2.14)    (-2.58)   
             
Tenure – Operators  .0016    .0021    .0009   
  (1.11)    (1.66)    (0.49)   
             
               Non-operators  .0038    -.0011    .0068   
  (2.45)    (-1.16)    (2.73)   
             
Education – Operators  .0050    .012    -.003   
  (0.61)    (1.92)    (-0.25)   
             
                    Non-operators  .021    .032    .007   
  (2.07)    (2.12)    (0.61)   
             
(Education)
 2 – Operators  -.0001    -.0004    .0001   
  (-0.38)    (-1.51)    (0.21)   
             
                         Non-operators  -.0007    -.0013    -.00003   
  (-1.45)    (-1.81)    (-0.06)   
             
R
2  0.54    0.41    0.60   
             
N  2657    885    889   
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Table Notes: 
 
Strong Ties refers to the sample of daily communications; Weak Ties refers to the sample of monthly 
communications; All Ties refers to the daily, weekly, and monthly communications.  There are 3 
observations per employee for each tie frequency for each of three different communication topics. 
 
Standard errors are adjusted for worker-specific clustering; t-statistics are in parentheses.  Also included 
are controls for type of communication topic and, in the ―all ties‖ model, frequency of communication. 
 Table 4 
 
Who Talks to Whom: The Probability of Communication for Pairs of Workers 
Dependent Variable:   Tie =1 if Communication Between Worker (i,j) Pair 
Tie =0 if No Communication   
 
  Team HR Lines 
Traditional HR 
Lines 
  (1)  (2) 
  strong ties  strong ties 
     
Mean of Dependent Variable                0.368  0.075 
     
Independent Variables     
Occupations     
1. Operator-Operator  0.311  -0.109 
  (4.12)  (-3.20) 
2. Manager-Manager  0.326  -0.053 
  (2.52)  (-1.16) 
3. Operator-Manager  0.291  -0.077 
  (3.76)  (-2.60) 
4. Staff-Manager  0.122  -0.064 
  (1.50)  (-2.02) 
5. Staff-Staff  0.154  -0.082 
  (2.21)  (-2.25) 
6. Staff-Operator  0.173  -0.093 
  (2.46)  (-2.68) 
7. Staff-Maintenance  0.095  -0.032 
  (1.20)  (-0.95) 
8. Operator-Maintenance  0.125  -0.070 
  (1.86)  (-2.38) 
9. Maintenance-Maintenance  0.471  0.038 
  (4.47)  (0.82) 
10. Supervisor-Supervisor  --------  -0.041 
    (-0.70) 
11. Supervisor-Staff  --------  -0.032 
    (-0.78) 
12. Supervisor-Operator  --------  -0.063 
    (-1.64) 
13. Supervisor-Maintenance  --------  0.008 
    (0.18)   2 
14. Manager-Maintenance  Omitted dummy variable 
     
Education     
15. Both High School  0.189  -0.010 
  (3.58)  (-0.59) 
16. Both Post High School  0.055  -0.001 
  (1.20)  (-0.08) 
17. Both College  -0.008  0.19 
  (-0.16)  (0.90) 
18. HS-Post High School  0.143  -0.009 
  (4.09)  (-0.68) 
19. HS – College  -0.075  0.009 
  (-1.47)  (0.59) 
20. Post High School-College     
     
Age     
21. Matching Age  0.020  0.005 
  (1.09)  (0.94) 
Tenure     
22. Both New  -0.063  0.045 
  (-1.32)  (2.35) 
23. Both Average  -0.037  -0.019 
  (-0.63)  (-1.87) 
24. Both Senior  0.058  0.147 
  (0.72)  (4.34) 
25. New- Average  -0.044  -0.009 
  (-1.14)  (-0.81) 
26. New- Senior  -0.153  0.031 
  (-3.18)  (2.31) 
27. Average- Senior  Omitted dummy variable 
     
R
2  0.09  0.05 
N  3893  12549 
Table Note:  The omitted categories for categorical variables above are manager-maintenance for 
occupations; post high school-college for education, average- senior for tenure, and non-matching 
age for age. 
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 Table 5 
Means of Selected Variables in Sample of Worker Communications Pairs 
 
 
          Mean 
Variable      Team Oriented   Traditional 
Strong Ties      .368    .075 
Weak Ties      .302    .052 
Both HS      .329    .328 
Both Post HS      .222    .230 
Both College      .078    .040 
HS- Post HS      .219    .301 
HS- College      .276    .190 
Both New      .427    .143 
New- Average      .292    .333 
New- Senior      .140    .139 
Both Average      .101    .189 
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Figure 3a - intra-crew Communication Interactions for IO Line 1 
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Figure 4a – Inter-group Communication Interactions for IO Line 1   9 
 

















































Figure 4b – Inter-group Communication Interactions for IO Line 2   10 
 












































































Figure 4d – Inter-group Communication Interactions for CO Line 2 